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CORPORATE NET OPERATING LOSSES-UBSON
SHOPS AND THE DECREASING AVAILABILITY
OF A LOSS CARRYOVER TO THE
SINGLE CORPORATION
OLIVER STEVENS SUGHRUE, JR. *
INTRODUCTION
The recent history of the federal judicial and legislative treat-
ment of corporate net operating loss carryovers and carrybacks has
indeed been turbulent. Although some form of provision allowing a
corporation to average its taxable income over a period of years has
generally been a part of our income tax law for many years, the
length of the averaging period has only recently been subjected to
major change.' In addition, the 1954 Internal Revenue Code con-
tained provisions representing the first Congressional attempt to deal
specifically with the problem of what changes in corporate "identity"
would cause denial of the privilege of averaging.' Previous Revenue
Acts had indicated that carryovers were to be allowed' only if the
corporation seeking the offset was the "same" as the one incurring
the loss. But since they typically provided only that a carryover was
available to "the taxpayer" sustaining the loss,' the courts were left
with the difficult task of determining whether, despite some change
within a corporation, it had nonetheless remained the "same" for the
limited purpose of using a loss carryover.
The current turbulence in the carryover area may fairly be
deemed the inevitable result of the ill-defined interplay of at least six
different principles each of which has been urged as relevant in de-
termining "sameness." First, a corporation which is merely a different
legal entity from the corporation sustaining the loss has been denied
a carryover even though in all other respects it retained the char-
* A.B. 1956, Harvard College; LL.B. 1962, Harvard Law School; Associate in the
firm of Rich, May & Bilodeau, Boston.
1 The Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 204(b), 40 Stat. 1061, first allowed aver-
aging to a corporation by providing for both a carryover and a carryback for a one-
year period. But the carryback was eliminated three years later by the Revenue Act
of 1921, ch. 136, § 204, 42 Stat. 231, and was not restored until 1942. Revenue Act of
1942, ch. 619, § 153, 56 Stat, 847. The most significant change in the length of the
averaging period occurred in 1950, when the carryover was extended to five years.
Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 944, § 215, 64 Stat. 937. At present, under § 172 of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code, a carryback may extend for three years and a carryover for
five.
2 IM. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 381, 382. These sections do not, however, treat all
types of corporate readjustments.
3 See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 122(6), added by ch. 619, § 153, .56 Stat.
900 (1942) ("If for any taxable year . . . the taxpayer has a net operating loss . ."
[emphasis added]).
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acteristics of its predecessor.4 Conversely, where a corporation
changed its ownership, business operation, name and location, it was
allowed a carryover because its entity remained undisturbed.' Sec-
ondly, when the ownership of a corporation changes hands, the "same-
ness" has been considered destroyed on the theory that the new
owners ought not to be given the "windfall" benefit of an advan-
tageous tax history with which they were not connected.' Third,
where a corporation discontinues a losing activity and seeks to offset
income obtained from a different type of business operation, the
carryover, for that reason alone, has been considered not merited.?
Fourth, the Congressional provisions for certain corporate reorganiza-
tions to be effectuated tax-free have been interpreted as frustrated
if a carryover is not permitted to survive.such reorganizations.' Thus,
even though a reorganized corporation may have a new entity, or a
different ownership and possibly even a new type of business
operation, the carryover will be allowed as consistent with Con-
gressional solicitude for these reorganizations .° Fifth, the attractive-
ness of a loss carryover as an independently valuable corporate asset
and the original validation of its transferability to new ownership
provoked the 1943 statutory response that when tax avoidance is
shown to be the principal purpose of the acquisition, the carryover will
be denied." Accordingly, acquisitions predominantly inspired by tax
avoidance purposes will not be effective to allow a carryover, even
though by some other test corporate "sameness" is undisturbed. Last,
and perhaps most troublesome, carryovers have been denied when
"continuity of business enterprise" is considered lacking. This doc-
trine, the legacy of Libson Shops v. Koehler," has been inconsistently
interpreted by courts seeking to apply it in the context of various
corporate readjustments other than the one with which the case
4 West Point Marion Coal Co., 19 B.T.A. 945 (1930); Athol Mfg. Co., 22 B.T.A.
105, aff'd, 54 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1931). But cf. Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States,
233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957), vacating and re-
manding 130 F. Supp. 706 (D.•Mass. 1955).
5 Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948); But cf. Mill Ridge Coal Co. v.
Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816 (1959), affirming on
this point, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1627 (N.D. AIa. 1958).
6 A. C. Willingham v. United States, 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1961). See text ac-
companying notes 136-40 infra.
7
 White no case has yet denied the carryover in this situation, the Commissioner
consistently argues for disallowance. See text accompanying notes 114-21 infra.
See Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra note 4.
9
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, i§ 381(a) and 38I(c) generally provide for carryovers
through § 368(a)(1)(A),(C),(D) and (F) reorganizations, subject to the 20% "con-
tinuing interest" requirement of § 382(b) (1) (B).
10
 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 129, added by the Revenue Act of 1943, § 128, 58
Stat. 47. Section 129 was the first tax avoidance provision of the revenue laws; until
1943, carryover disallowance rested totally on judicial determination that the "tax-
payer" claiming the offset was significantly different from the one incurring the loss.
11 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
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itself dealt, namely, a statutory merger. The inconsistency has been
especially apparent in the case of the single corporation which ex-
periences either a change in the type of its business activity and/or
in its ownership but retains an undisturbed legal entity. 12
 Some courts
and commentators maintain that the Libson doctrine of "continuity of
business enterprise" can have no application to the single corpo-
ration." Others insist that it can, on the premise that the required
continuity is destroyed when both ownership and business activity
change significantly." Still a third suggestion is that either of the two
changes is sufficient." This article will examine the meaning of the
Libson doctrine; it will then consider the merits of suggested ex-
tensions into the so-called single corporation area, particularly its
possible application when the corporation has changed only its
ownership or its type of business under the still relevant 1939 Code
as well as the 1954 Code.
It should be noted initially that the turbulence persists despite
the new provisions of the 1954 Code. These provisions do not contain
a unified carryover policy." Sections 381(a) and 381(c) allow
corporations surviving certain tax-free reorganizations to inherit loss
carryovers, but the inheritance is reduced to the extent that share-
holders in the "loss corporation" fail to retain an interest equal to
at least twenty per cent of the fair market value of the stock of the
acquiring corporation." Section 382(a) imposes on the purchasers
of fifty per cent or more of the stock of such corporation the require-
ment that they continue "substantially the same" trade or business
as was conducted before the stock purchase, in order to use a carry-
over." This section thus incorporates the requirements of continuity
of both ownership and type of business activity. And the tax avoid-
ance provisions, which Congress attempted to strengthen by adding
subsection (c) to section 269, continue to pervade many corporate
readjustments by disallowing carryovers when the acquisition of the
stock or assets of a corporation is proven to be primarily far the
12 Compare British Motor Car Distrib., Inc. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 437 (1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 278 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1960), with Mill Ridge Coal Co. v.
Patterson, supra note 5.
13
 See, e.g., the Tax Court opinion in British Motor Car Distrib., Inc. v. Com-
missioner, supra note 12; Levine and Petta, Libson Shops Applied to the Single
Corporate Taxpayer, 36 Taxes 562, 564 (1958). See also 353 U.S. 382, 390 n.9.
14
 See, e.g., Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, supra note 5; Virginia Metal Prod.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1961).
16 See text accompanying notes 114-21 and 136-40 infra. .
16
 See \Vinton, Loss Carryovers: Courts Grope Toward Judicial Doctrine of
Business Continuity, 11 J. Taxation 76 (1959), characterizing the new provisions as
"each with a different test, a different underlying policy and different penalties."
17
 This limitation is imposed by Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 382(b).
18
 Under § 382(a)(1), the "trade or business" need be continued only for two
taxable years, counting the year in which the purchase occurred as one. Further, the
section applies only to taxable purchases. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 382(a)(4).
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purpose of avoiding income tax." Thus, the new Code demands that
corporate "sameness" be defined in specific situations in terms of
one or more of the principles of continuity of ownership, continuity
of type of business operation, solicitude towards tax-free reorganiza-
tions and the disallowance of benefits sought principally to avoid
taxes. But several common corporate readjustments were left un-
covered by the new provisions.' Further, the most controversial carry-
over principle, Libson's continuity of business enterprise, was unknown
to the drafters of the new Code." The courts, therefore, are still forced
to resolve frequent conflicts among the above enumerated six principles
in their attempts to administer carryover justice.
LIBSON SHOPS
A. The Decision
The Libson case presented a conflict between two of these carry-
over principles under the 1939 Code. The taxpayer was a corporation
into which had merged, pursuant to state statute, sixteen separate
corporations. Before the merger, the taxpayer had provided manage-
ment services for the other sixteen, each of which operated one retail
women's apparel store. All seventeen corporations were owned by
the same individuals in the same proportions. After the merger, the
taxpayer continued to conduct all of the former operations and new
shares were exchanged pro rata for the old shares of the apparel
store corporations; the merger had therefore caused no disturbance
in ownership or business activity. The only relevant change was one
of corporate entity—seventeen separate corporations had become one
single corporation. The taxpayer sought to carry forward the pre-
merger losses of three of its constituents, each of which continued to
lose money after the merger, to offset income derived from the
profitable operations of the other stores. Under the 1939 Code, this
required a determination of whether the post-merger entity was, for
carryover purposes, the same "taxpayer" as the three merged con-
stituents.' The conflict in carryover principles was posed by the
juxtaposition of the doctrine of New Colonial Ice Co. u. Helvering 23
19 Section 269 applies only if a stock purchase enables the purchaser to obtain
control of a corporation, or if a corporation obtains the property of another corpora-
tion, which at the time of the purchase was not controlled by the purchaser or its
shareholders, and obtains the transferor's basis for the property.
20 For example, §§ 381 and 382 do not cover taxable asset purchases by a loss
corporation, changes of business or ownership within a single corporation not involving
tax-free reorganization, nor § 368(a) (1) (13) and (E) reorganizations.
21 The Libson decision postdated the new Code by three years.
22 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 122(b), supra note 3.
2s 292 U.S. 435 (1934). This case involved a situation in which a corporation
with losses set up a subsidiary into which it transferred all its assets in exchange for
a portion of the subsidiary's stock which was thereupon distributed to the parent's
shareholders in exchange for the old stock. The subsidiary later sought to use the
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which stood for the proposition that since the merger had effected a
change in the entity of the loss corporations there could be no carry-
over, and the rationale of Stanton Brewery, Inc. v. Commissioner"
to the effect that a corporation resulting from a statutory merger
is to be treated as the same taxable entity as its constituents to whose
legal attributes it has succeeded by operation of state law. The
Supreme Court, however, did not resolve this conflict but ruled
in accordance with the Government's "alternative argument" that
"the carry-over privilege is not available unless there is a continuity
of business enterprise," 25 and on this basis denied the carryover.
The only explicit guide which the Court left to 'indicate why the
merger had destroyed the necessary continuity was its concluding
statement that "petitioner is not entitled to a carry-over since the
income against which the offset is claimed was not produced by
substantially the same businesses which incurred the losses." 26 To
this statement it appended the now famous footnote 9, in which the
Court said:
We do not pass on situations like those presented in North-
way Securities Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 532; Alprosa
Watch Corp. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 240; A. B. & Con-
tainer Corp. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 842; WAGE, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 19 T.C. 249. In these cases a single corporate
taxpayer changed the character of its business and the tax-
able income of one of its enterprises was reduced by the
deductions or credits of another. 27
parent's losses but the carryover was denied on the basis that "the two corporations
were not identical but distinct." Id. at 441. New Colonial was subsequently relied
on to deny a carryover to a successor corporation after a merger. Franklin v. United
States, 83 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1936). But cf. Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States,
supra note 4, distinguishing New Colonial as inapplicable to a statutory merger.
24 176 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1949). Stanton gave a holding company the unused ex-
cess profits credit of an operating subsidiary which disappeared in a statutory merger
of the two companies. The court considered New Colonial's voluntary transfer of assets
as distinguishable from the situation where, by operation of the state. merger statute,
the "resulting corporation . . absorbs the rights and privileges, as well as the obliga-
tions, of its constituents." Id. at 575. The court found there was "essentially a con-
tinuing enterprise." Id. at 577. This very language was cited with apparent approval
by the Supreme Court in Libson, which would seem to cloud the meaning of essential
continuity, since in both cases there was a state statute producing an "operation of
law" merger and there was no break in continuity of either ownership or type of
business activity; yet the Stanton court allowed the carryover and Libson court denied
it. A possible reason for the different results is suggested by the fact that in Libson,
the carryover would have been unavailable if there had been no merger whereas in
Stanton, "without the merger the [corporation] would have been entitled to the
claimed carry-over." Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 229 F.2d 220, 227 (8th Cir. 1956),
aff'd, 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
27" 353 U.S. at 386.
Id, at 390.
27 Id. at n.9. In each of the cases referred to in the footnote the carryover had
been allowed since the entity had been undisturbed. It is interesting to note the sev-
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Subsequently, however, many cases have been forced to answer the
question of what effect, if any, the Libson decision has on the tra-
ditional ability of a single corporate entity to carry forward a loss
notwithstanding a change in its type of business operation or owner-
ship or both. But since there has been no universal agreement even
on what the Supreme Court meant by "continuity of business enter-
prise," it followed that other courts would disagree on whether the
principle applied to the single corporation.'
B. Continuity of Business Enterprise
What was "continuity of business enterprise" supposed to mean?
At one end of the spectrum of interpretation is the view that Libson's
"continuity" is a requirement only in the case of a merger or con-
solidation of two or more distinct corporate entities. This view
focuses on the Court's construction of the issue in the case as being
whether, notwithstanding the change in entity effected by the merger,
there existed sufficient identity between the successor corporation
and its loss constituents so as to allow for their treatment as the same
"taxpayer."29
 According to this interpretation, when the initial change
in entity does not occur—as with adjustments effected within a single
corporation—the dispute over identity does not arise and the require-
ment of continuity of business enterprise is therefore irrelevant."
Two commentators,31
 viewing the doctrine as inapplicable to the
single corporation, have narrowly construed its operation in the
merger case. They view the merger as destroying the required con-
tinuity when the total business operations of the successor corporation
differ from that conducted by each of the merged companies. Because
oral dozen references to footnote 9 which later courts have made. In retrospect, it
seems that the language of the footnote, in which the court was simply attempting to
exclude certain matters from the scope of its decision, was perhaps the only helpful
tool which Mr. Justice Burton's opinion left for the use of practitioners. Certainly
the crux of his opinion—the oft-repeated statement that "continuity of business enter-
prise" had been found lacking—is by its very vagueness inadequate as a tool by which
to conduct business planning. Especially is this so since Libson's ambiguous language
was appearing in a quite unusual context, that posed by merger pursuant to state Iaw.
28 See supra note 12.
29
 The Court characterized the issue as "whether it can be said that petitioner, a
combination of 16 sales businesses, is 'the taxpayer' having the pre-merger losses of
three of those businesses." 353 U.S. at 385. In resolving it, the Court ruled that only
to the extent that there was continuity of business enterprise "is the same 'taxpayer'
involved." Id. at 386.
39
 The Court's analysis of legislative history indicates support for this view. While
failing to find Congressional intent that merger was to enable the averaging of "the
premerger losses of one business with the post-merger income of some other business
which had been operated and taxed separately before the merger," it found "Congress
primarily was concerned with the fluctuating income of a single business." 353 U.S.
at 387. Thus, while a limit on carryovers after mergers might well be consistent with
Congressional intent, Congress had revealed no desire to place a similar limit on carry-
overs to a "single business."
31
 Levine and Petta, Libson Shops: A Study in Semantics, 36 Taxes 445 (1958).
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".	 . the operation of 16 stores is a different business from the
operation of one store . . . there was no business continuity, and as a
result the successor was not the same taxpayer. 732 These commen-
tators, therefore, would claim that a carryover could survive only when
the merger united one corporation actively engaged in business with a
mere corporate shell, in which there existed no meaningful economic
activity. This reading appears to be based on the Court's apparent
approval of the results in Stanton and Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United
States.'" In both of these cases, there was only one active business
operation before and after the merger. As yet, however, no case has
adopted this definition of business continuity. 34 Its chief defect would
seem to stem from its clear implication that had the three Libson loss
corporations been profitable after the merger the carryover would
nevertheless have been denied. But the Supreme Court's subsequent
analysis of Newmarket cuts sharply against this suggested result and
indicates a second, more plausible meaning of "continuity of business
enterprise."
The Court analyzed Newmarket as properly allowing a carry-
back because there, "But for the merger, the old corporation itself
would have been entitled to a carry-back."" Libson obviously pre-
sented the converse situation: since the three loss stores continued
in the red after the merger, they would have had no opportunity to
use the carryover in the absence of merger. But because the Court
could not construe the carryover provisions to allow a merger to
bring about a "windfall" otherwise unobtainable, the carryover was
denied. Placing the Newmarket rationale alongside the Libson result
leads to an interpretation of "continuity of business enterprise" as a
requirement that the loss entities be traced into the amalgamated
entity so that carryovers are used only against profits derived by the
very same traceable entity as had incurred the losses. The tracing is
necessary only to ensure that the merger act in a completely neutral
fashion with respect to carryovers. This view of Libson's real message
as demanding neutrality of the merger device squares nicely with the
Court's refusal to pass directly on the Stanton-New Colonial conflict.'
Adherence to New Colonial would have demanded denial of the
32
 Id. at 448.
33 Supra note 4.
34 F. C. Donovan, Inc. v. United States, 261 F.2d 470 (1st Cir. 1958), allowed a
carryback although previously separate businesses had been conducted, and Old National
Bank in Evansville v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1958), allowed a carryover
of an unused excess profits credit in the same situation.
35 353 U.S. at 388. Similarly, the Circuit Court in Libson implied that the result
in Stanton had been reached because the carryover would have been available but for
the merger. See supra note 24.
3' Referring to the Stanton-New Cotonial conflict, the Court stated that "we
find it unnecessary to discuss this issue since an alternative argument made by the
Government is dispositive of this case." 353 U.S. at 386.
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carryover because of the change in entity effected by the merger.
Thus a carryover otherwise available would disappear simply by virtue
of the act of merging. Stanton, on the other hand, would have
allowed merger to become an affirmative carryover tool by auto-
matically entitling the resultant corporation to succeed to the tax
attributes of merged constituents. This "windfall" result, an obvious
invitation to tax avoidance, was rejected by the Court's construction
of the carryover provisions as "not to give a merged taxpayer an
advantage over others who have not merged." 37 But neither of these
suggested results satisfied the Court, because both were inconsistent
with its suggested view that merger should act neutrally on loss
carryovers.
The foregoing interpretation of "continuity of business" equates
"substantially the same business" with the artificially traced post-
merger entity. Continuity is maintained only if the loss entity, as
traced into the successor corporation, derives from its own business
operations profits against which its losses can be offset. If the loss
activity is discontinued, or if it is retained but continues to lose
money, there can be no carryover because it would have been un-
available to the entity if there had been no merger. But if the assets
used in conducting the loss operation are sold and the proceeds used
to buy a new kind of business, the offset should be available when
the new activity yields the necessary profits. This result follows from
the fact that the prevailing law both before and after Libson has not
disallowed a carryover when a single enterprise merely shifts from
one type of business activity to another. 38
 Therefore, the fact that
the traced entity changes the type of its economic endeavor after the
merger and seeks to carry forward a loss against profits earned in a
new line should not operate to deny the carryover. The continuity
which Libson demanded was, according to the Court's own words,
that of an "enterprise" rather than of a mere "business." Nothing
in the opinion suggests that the traced loss corporation must continue
in the identical economic activity in order that the resultant corporation
be entitled to the use of the carryover. In fact, the approval by the
Court of the result in Koppers Co. v. United States" indicates that
changes in the type of business within a single corporation are
irrelevant in determining "continuity of business enterprise." In
Koppers, the merged corporations had filed consolidated returns
prior to the merger and for this reason were deemed the same
"taxable enterprise" both before and after the merger. It was ir-
37 353 U.S. at 389-90.
35
 See, e.g., Kolker Bros., Inc,, 35 T.C. No. 38 (Nov. 21, 1960); Alprosa Watch
Corp., supra note 5.
39
 133 Ct. Cl. 22, 134 F. Supp. 290 (1955), cert. denied, 353 U.S, 983 (1957). See
353 U.S. 388, n.7.
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relevant in Koppers whether the individual corporations continued
the same line of business after the merger as they conducted before.
If merger is to bring into play adverse tax consequences as a result
of post-merger changes in economic activity then it is clearly not
acting neutrally with respect to the availability of carryovers. This
is because a single corporation could have used the carryover, not-
withstanding a change in its business, had it not merged.
One article" has criticized this "entity-tracing" view of con-
tinuity of business enterprise because of its allowance of a carryover
from one pre-merger type of business to a new and different post-
merger line of activity. This result allegedly treats merger as a
"vehicle for free transferability."" But because the law has at least
heretofore never objected to this much "transferability" to a single
corporation which does not merge, the Libson message of merger
neutrality is being violated when a corporation which merges has
thereby lost the carryover it could otherwise have used.
Nonetheless, the Internal Revenue Service has read Libson to
impose this limitation on changes in the type of business activity
following a merger; its reading is thus still a third interpretation of
"continuity of business enterprise." 42 Rev. Rul. 59-395 provides
that following a merger or a consolidation, the tax consequences of
which are determined under the 1939 Code,'" the operating-losses of
an absorbed constituent "may be carried over to the resultant corpo-
ration to the extent that such losses . . . offset income of the resultant
corporation attributable to assets acquired by it from the absorbed
constituent and used in continuing the prefusion business of such
absorbed constituent.' The latter phrase imposes a substantive
limitation on economic activity changes which follow the merger since
the resultant corporation by implication cannot use the loss con-
stituent's carryover unless its "prefusion business" is continued after
the merger. The phrase ". . . assets acquired • . . and used . . ."
suggests that the carryover is applicable not just to profits obtained
from continuing the same activity as conducted by the loss corporation
but also to those derived by using only the very assets acquired in the
merger. This result would handicap businesses with rapid rates of
turnover of both capital and current assets and would motivate
corporations about to be merged to build up inventory and replace
4° Comment, 69 Yale L.J. 1201 (1960).
41 Id. at 1218.
42 Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 475.
'" Under the 1954 Code the Commissioner will not apply the Libson test to § 381
transactions, which include a statutory merger. Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 Cum. Bull.
147.
14 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 475 at 476. The "asset approach" of the Revenue Ruling is
also the interpretation of Sinrich, Libson Shops—An Argument Against Its Applica-
tion Under the 1954 Code, 13 Tax L. Rev. 167 (1958).
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capital assets even though pure business considerations would not
call for such ill-timed adjustments. Since general carryover policy
does not suggest any reason to discriminate against industry with
high turnover rates, the ruling may well be interpreted to allow the
replacement of assets acquired in the merger and a tracing to ensure
that the post-merger profits sought to be offset are "attributable to"
them. A more serious problem arises from the apparent preclusion
of an offset against income earned from assets added after the merger
to continue the loss operation. If the relevant income must be
attributable to assets "acquired . . . from the absorbed constituent,"
then the post-merger addition of a new plant, for example, even
though used exclusively to continue the loss operation, will not produce
profits capable of being offset by the old loss. While a limit on
changing the type of activity after a merger derives some support from
a view that merger should not enable a carryover against a different
type of business, there appears to be no justification for placing a
similar penalty on a mere change in degree rather than kind. Yet the
Ruling suggests that a business which is merely intensified is thereby
not "substantially the same.""
A further problem associated with the Treasury Department's
interpretation of "continuity of business enterprise" arises from the
specific requirement of the Ruling that the post-merger income which
can be offset must be derived from "continuing the prefusion
business." A merger typically involves some changes in the conduct
of formerly distinct operations. But any change at all runs the risk
that the new corporation may not be considered as conducting the
"prefusion business." Thus, inherent in Rev. Rul. 59-395 are difficult
problems of deciding when, despite some change, the business operation
conducted after the merger is qualitatively the same as that conducted
before. Similar definitional problems exist under Section 382(a) of
the 1954 Code, where, in order for a carryover to be allowed after
the purchase of controlling stock in a corporation, the corporation
must continue "a trade or business substantially the same as that
conducted before!'" The Regulations under section 382 indicate
that no single formula can be applied to determine "sameness" in
this context; instead, numerous factors are made relevant but with
no indication as to their respective weights. 41 It should be noted
that the "entity-tracing" approach to continuity of business does
possess the obvious virtue of eliminating this problem, since the
successor corporation need not continue the same qualitative prefusion
business of the loss corporation in order to be given its carryover.
45 No case supporting this position has been discovered. Kolker Bros., inc., supra
note 32, suggests the contrary. See text accompanying notes 120-21 infra.
46
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 382(a)(1)(C).
47
 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-1(h) (5), 25 Fed. Reg. 13778 (1960).
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C. Extension to the Single Corporation
Viewing Libson as requiring the continuity of the particular type
of activity conducted by the loss corporation enables the extension of
the doctrine into the single corporation area—the opposite end of the
spectrum of interpretation of "continuity of business enterprise."
Notwithstanding the possible admonition inherent in footnote 9, 48
many decisions under the 1939 Code have denied carryovers within a
single corporate entity." Most of the cases involve changes in owner-
ship and tax avoidance in addition to the change in profit directed
activity, and Libson is customarily invoked without any indication
of which of the three factors or combination thereof destroys con-
tinuity. Typical of these decisions is the case of Mill Ridge Coal Co.
v. Patterson," involving a corporation engaged in a losing coal mining
operation which sold all of its assets prior to the purchase of its stock
by new owners. A profitable oil business was then inserted into the
shell and the carryover from the former business was sought to be
used against the new profits. The District Court found that the
purchase was not for the principal purpose of tax avoidance but
decided the case for the Government since it felt itself "bound by the
reasoning of the Supreme Court" in Libson." The court seems to
have considered decisive the qualitative change in the nature of Mill
Ridge's business,52 even though no such change occurred in Libson,
where the retail selling of women's apparel continued after the merger
as before. The Fifth Circuit affirmed but disagreed with the District
Court, both on the tax avoidance issue and possibly on the application
of Libson. With respect to the latter, the Circuit Court's interpretation
of the carryover provisions as primarily directed against "windfall"
benefits and "trading" in carryovers implies strongly that the change
in business cannot permit the invocation of Libson unless preceded by
a significant change in ownership. 53 But Libson itself involved no
change in ownership.
Although Mill Ridge clearly establishes that the Libson rationale
can be extended to the single corporate entity, there exists confusion
as to exactly how it extends. Any one of the three factors involved
in the case—tax avoidance, change in business and change in owner-
4 8 One commentator, Sinrich, supra note 44, at 176, has interpreted footnote 9 as
being an unequivocal determination that "continuity of business enterprise" can have
no application to the single corporation.
49 See, e.g., Virginia Metal Prod., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 14; Mill Ridge
Coal Co. v. Patterson, supra note 5; J. G. Dudley Co., 36 T.C. No. 112 (Feb.
28, 1961). But see British Motor Car Distrib., Inc. v. Commissióner, supra note 12;
Ko]ker Bros., Inc., supra note 38..
5 Supra note 5.
51 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 1629.
" Id. at 1629-30.
n 3
 264 F.2d at 717.
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ship--might be looked upon as determinative, and indeed each one
has been so viewed."
One recent case has applied Libson to the Mill Ridge fact
situation where there was no evidence of tax avoidance. In Virginia
Metal Products, Inc. v. Commissioner, 55
 a parent corporation trans-
ferred assets from its profitable steel products construction business
to a newly bought subsidiary. The subsidiary had incurred a sub-
stantial loss carryover in the businesses of aluminum manufacturing
and sales of furnace stokers. After the purchase by Virginia
Metal, the assets used in these businesses were sold so that only the
shell remained when the new assets were transferred to the subsidiary.
The Tax Court held that Libson was inapplicable per footnote 9 and
decided for the taxpayer in accordance with the authority stemming
from Alprosa Watch Corp." allowing for a carryover from one type of
business to another within a single corporation. The Court of Appeals
reversed, claiming that Libson was "unmistakably decisive" and that
the disallowance of the carryover must follow "a fortiori" from
Libson." The court thought that Libson "is a stronger case for the
taxpayer than the one before us. The shareholders remained the same
in these various Libson corporations. The same business was carried
on after the merger as before. They all continued to sell women's
apparel."58
 This very language indicates that the lack of continuity
between the three loss corporations and Libson Shops, Inc. cannot be
explained by the failure to continue the business nor by any change
in ownership. The jump from Libson to the Virginia Metal result
would therefore seem to require more of an explanation than is
afforded by the use of the term "a fortiori" or of the unhelpful
conclusion that ". . . the thrust of that decision easily includes such a
54 Levine and Petta, supra note 13, at 564, state that "Under Mill Ridge, a single
taxpayer could not utilize its own loss against profits of a different divisional business
even where there is no change of ownership. . [T]he basis of the decision in Mill
Ridge is change of business, not change of ownership." Comment, 69 Yale L.J. 1201,
at 1229, while recognizing the ambiguity of the opinion, suggests the change in owner-
ship to have been decisive. Friedman and Cuddihy, Multiplying Cases Extend, but
Do Not Clarify Libson Rule in Loss Carryovers, 15 J. Taxation 338, 342 (1961),
maintain that "It is to be gravely doubted that the case would have been so decided
had there been no tax avoidance. . • ."
55
 290 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1961).
56 11 T.C. 240 (1948). The Tax Court in Virginia Metal used Alprosa as authority
for its conclusion that
In the instant case, Winfield [the loss subsidiary] is the same corporate
entity that sustained the net operating losses in question. It is not seeking to
reduce the income of some other corporate entity by reason of such losses.
It only seeks to carry forward and apply them against its own income. This
is in accord with the statute, the regulations, and with our decisions.
33 T.C. 788, at 799 (1960).
157 290 F.2d at 677. 676.
68 Id. at 677.
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case as this."" Moreover, the court relied on three decisions as
authority for its result; two of them involved carryovers from one
entity to another and thus did not present the single corporation
issue." The third, Mill Ridge, is arguably distinguishable as having
found, perhaps determinatively, that the stock purchase was made
for the primary purpose of avoiding income taxes.
Mill Ridge and Virginia Metal cannot be justified by the view
of Libson as deciding only that the device of merger should act
completely neutrally with respect to carryovers." If the change in
entity which occurred as a result of the Libson Shops merger brought
into play the question of whether the "identity" of the loss corpo-
rations remained in the successor corporation, then no question of
"identity" arises when there is no change in entity as in Hill Ridge
or Virginia Metal."' This was the reasoning of the Tax Court in
British Motor Car Distrib., Ltd. v. Commissioner," a case involving
the typical change in control of the loss corporation, discontinuation
of the loss activity and the injection of a new and profitable business.
The Tax Court held Libson inapplicable. It could find no justification
for disallowing a carryover to offset profits earned from a new type of
business within a single corporation." British Motor Car therefore
stands opposed to Mill Ridge and Virginia Metal on substantially
equivalent facts.
But even if it is difficult or impossible to justify Mill Ridge and
Virginia Metal as a matter of proper interpretation of Libson,
Congress has indicated that for cases decided under the 1954 Code,
the result in each of these cases will be proper. Both presented a set
of facts characteristic of the typical case of "trafficking in loss
corporations," which Congress dealt with specifically in Section 382 (a)
of the new Code.° This alleged evil occurs—as in Mill Ridge and
Virginia Metal—when a corporation with an available loss carryover




 Bookwalter v. Hutchens Metal Prod., Inc., 281 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1960)
(statutory merger) ; Patten Fine Papers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 776 (7th Cir.
1957) (parent corporation disallowed carryover of losses incurred by liquidated sub-
sidiary).
61
 See text accompanying notes 35-41 supra.
62
 Sec Arent, Current Developments Affecting Loss Corporations, 35 Taxes 956
(1957) ; Burnstein, Problems in the Use of Loss Carry-Overs, 39 Taxes 1065 (1961) ;
Levine and Petta, supra notes 13 & 31.
63 Supra note 12.
f" The court's rationale was virtually identical to its reasoning in Virginia Matti.
See supra note 56.
65
 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954) refers to § 382(a) as a
"special limitation on net operating loss carryovers fprovidingl an objective standard
governing the availability of a major tax benefit which has been abused through traf-
ficking in corporations with operating loss carryovers. . . ."
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over." Thus when the old activity is not continued and a new and
profitable business is injected into the void, the new owners are
immediately suspected of originally contemplating using the shell
in which it operated solely to derive the carryover benefit. Section
382 (a) therefore conclusively presumes the principal motivation to
be tax avoidance when these facts unfold. The difficulties of proving
subjective intent demanded by section 269 were felt to warrant the
addition of the new section to cover this special category of cases
where a legitimate business purpose for the undertaking would almost
invariably be absent."
But when the facts do not present the "trafficking" situation,
the application of Libson to deny a carryover to a single corporate
entity under the 1939 Code cannot derive support from even this
"subsequent" legislative' development. Nonetheless, the Commissioner
has argued that Libson is authority for denying a carryover when the
only change taking place within a corporation is a change in the type
of its business activity's or its ownership." Because these arguments
are still being made under 1954 Code cases, consideration of their
merits in this article will be deferred until the framework of the new
Code is presented and the issue raised as to the possibility of Libson's
vitality under the new provisions.
THE 1954 CODE AND Libson
A. The Statutory Pattern
The relevant carryover provisions of the 1954 Code are Sections
172, 269, 381 and 382. Section 172 provides for the deduction of net
operating losses with an allowance for a three year carryback and a
five year carryover. 70
 Unlike its predecessor, Section 122 of the 1939
Code, this section does not grant the carryover or carryback to "the
taxpayer." One commentator has argued that the omission of this
language by itself should preclude any Libson application to the
single corporation under the new Code." It is true that Libson did
address itself to a case where, because of a merger, the pre-merger
66
 The emphasis on this purpose as the target of § 382(a) is revealed in S. Rep.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954):
Your committee has adopted a provision to limit the application of this pro-
vision relating to purchase to those areas in which abuse has most often
arisen, that is, the purchase of the stock of a corporation with a history of
losses for the purpose of using its loss carryovers to offset gains of a business
unrelated to that which produced the loss. [Emphasis added.]
67 Ibid.
68
 Kolker Bros., 35 T.C. No. 38 (Nov. 21, 1960); Joseph Weidenhoff, Inc., 32 T.C.
1222 (1959).
69
 A. C. Willingham v. United States, 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1961). See text ac-
companying notes 136-40 infra.
70 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 172(b)(1).
71
 Sinrich, supra note 44, at 176.
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taxpayer's "identity" in the successor had to be ascertained in order
to allow the carryover. But Mill Ridge, Virginia Metal and other
cases have rejected the implication that because the bare entity of a
corporation remains undisturbed after a change in its business and/or
ownership there arises no dispute as to taxpayer identity and "con-
tinuity of business enterprise" should therefore be irrelevant. Thus,
while Libson itself may have intended no disruption of the traditional
free allowance of carryovers within a single corporation, subsequent
cases have disagreed. Their doctrine would seem to make immaterial
the omission from the new Code of the term "the taxpayer." In
addition, the Congress did not omit the term with the Libson case in
mind, because the case was decided three years after the effective date
of the new act. Instead, it appears that the probable reason for the
omission of the term was that the "taxpayers" to whom carryovers
would not accrue were largely—though not entirely—spelled out
specifically in sections 381 and 382.
Section 381(a) provides for the inheritance of certain tax attri-
butes by a corporation acquiring the assets of another corporation in
designated tax-free transactions." Section 381(c) includes net oper-
ating loss carryovers among the inheritable items. The section thus
adds to non-recognition of gain the succession to carryovers as induce-
ments to the effectuation of these tax-free transactions. But this induce-
ment has its limitations. First, section 382(b) provides generally
for a reduction in the carryover when the loss corporation's share-
holders end up after the reorganization with less than a twenty per
cent stock interest in the acquiring corporation. For every percentage
point interest less than twenty per cent, the section reduces the carry-
over by five per cent. Section 382(b) thus prevents the use of a
carryover when its benefits are to be enjoyed entirely by new owners,
but it enables most of the enjoyment to accrue to new owners who
successfully manage to ensure only a limited retention of interest
by old shareholders. Second, the Regulations under section 269
indicate that transactions qualifying under section 381 must still
overcome the tax avoidance hurdle for the carryover to be allowed."
On the other hand, business planners have a significant advantage in
planning transactions under section 381, since the Treasury has ruled
that the Libson doctrine is inapplicable to such transactions. 74
Section 382(a) provides the focus of Congressional treatment
of the single corporation undergoing changes in type of business and
72
 These qualifying transactions are a § 332 tax-free liquidation of a subsidiary
(except where the basis of the assets received is determined by § 334(b) (2)), and
§ 368(a)(1) (A), (C), (D) and (F) reorganizations, provided that in the (D) reor-
ganization, liquidation of the transferor follows so that only the transferee corpora-
tion continues.
73 Treas. Reg. § 1.269-6 (1962).
74 Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 147.
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ownership where no tax-free reorganization is involved. The Revenue
Ruling which rendered Libson inapplicable to Section 381 transactions
specifically left open the possibility of a Libson extension to section
382 (a), 75 and the Regulations superimpose section 269 onto section
382(a) .76 This section eliminates a carryover completely when fifty
per cent of a corporation's stock is purchased in a taxable transfer
and the corporation "has not continued to carry on a trade or business
substantially the same as that conducted before' the change in
ownership. Section 382(a) thus provides an entirely different carry-
over rationale to the stock purchase case than does section 381 to the
tax-free asset purchase. In the latter case there is no requirement
that the loss business operation continue and the continuity of interest
requirement is only twenty per cent; even then, the carryover is not
lost, but only reduced, if something less than twenty per cent results.
This discrepancy is undoubtedly a reflection of the difference between
the two-fold Congressional purpose of stimulating tax-free readjust-
ments via section 381, while at the same time discouraging "traffick-
ing" in loss corporations—the stated objective of section 382(a)."
The new Code thus shows a liberalizing trend of permitting broadened
survival of carryovers except in the section 382(a) case felt to involve
particular abuse."
The new Regulations under section 382(a) illustrate the diffi-
culties involved in a determination of whether a corporation has,
despite some change, nevertheless continued "substantially the same"
trade or business." Treasury Regulation 1.382(a)-1(h) (5) simply
states that all the facts and circumstances will be taken into account
in the determination. It lists a number of "relevant factors" including
changes of plant, equipment, product, customers, employees and lo-
cation without indicating their relative weight or when a single one
could prove determinative. Another regulation allows a loss corpo-
ration to add a new business after the stock purchase; the losses
from the old activity can be offset against profits from the new,
provided only that the old business be continued for two taxable
years. 81 Allowing such an offset seems inconsistent with the Senate
Report indicating that the function of section 382(a) was to disallow
carryovers when loss corporation stock is purchased "for the purpose
75 Ibid.
76 Treas. Reg. § 1.269-6 (1962).
77 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 382(a) (1) (C). This subsection was not present in
the original draft of § 382 offered in the House of Representatives. See H.R, Rep. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954).
78 See supra note 65.
79 See Reese, Reorganization Transfers and Survival of Tax Attributes, 16 Tax
L. Rev. 207, 223 (1961).
80 See Friedman and Cuddihy, Treasury's Concept of Change of Business for Loss
Carryover Seen as Too Broad, 15 J. Taxation 278 (1961).
81 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1-382(a)-1(h) (8), 25 Fed. Reg. 13779 (1960).
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of using its loss carryovers to offset gains of a business unrelated to
that which produced the losses." 82 [Emphasis added.] This language
suggests no amelioration merely because the loss activity is continued.
Furthermore, the "two year continuation" requirement apparently
presupposes that when the loss business is even nominally continued
for the necessary period, the tax avoidance possibilities must not have
been paramount when the stock purchase was contemplated. To
allow for an escape from section 382 (a) in a case where the conduct
of the loss operation is not bona fide, but is rather a subterfuge for a
standard "trafficking" case, weakens the scope of the section and
prevents its application to cases which otherwise present the forbidden
characteristics. This is especially significant in view of the fact that
the "two year" rule can be satisfied in actual operation by a period
of slightly over one year."
Section 269 completes the statutory framework. Its predecessor,
Section 129 of the 1939 Code," was designed generally to limit those
stock or asset purchases which were primarily motivated by the desire
to obtain the benefit of tax attributes. In operation, however, section
129 proved to be a "weak" weapon against "abusive" use of loss
carryovers."' In contrast, section 269 seems currently a far more
effective statutory provision. This improvement is largely the result
of the recent rejection of a common construction of section 269(a) (1)
which had considerably narrowed its scope. That section disallows a
carryover when control of a corporation is acquired for the principal
purpose of "evasion or avoidance of federal income tax by securing
the benefit of a deduction, credit or other allowance which such
[acquiring] person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy.'
In the 1948 Alprosa decision, the Tax Court interpreted this language
to disallow the deduction when taken by the acquiring corporation or
individuals but not if by the acquired corporation. 87 The cases
following Alprosa illustrated the particular inability of this section
to cope with the typical "trafficking" case, since so long as the loss
entity remained to utilize its own carryover, the purchasers were not
82
 See supra note 66.
83 Surrey & Warren, Federal Income Taxation 1599 (1960 ed.). The Treasury has
tried to close the "loophole" created by the inapplicability of § 382(a) to the case
where the loss activity is continued nominally for the required two years, in Proposed
Treas. Reg. 1.269-3(b) (1960). This Regulation allows for a presumption that tax
avoidance was the principal purpose of an acquisition of a loss corporation when a
different and profitable business is transferred into the loss corporation, even though
the loss activity is continued.
84 §§ 129(a) (1) and (2) were virtually identical to the new §§ 269(a) (1) and
(2).
85 See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954).
85
 Additionally, § 269(a) (2) covers certain asset purchases by a corporation,
provided that the purchase is not taxable. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 269(a) (2).
87
 Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240, 245 (1948) (dictum),
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considered as themselves obtaining any proscribed benefit." Recently,
this construction has been rejected and the prevailing view at present
is that a purchaser secures the "benefit" of a carryover even though
the purchased corporation is the taxpayer actually taking the de-
duction." The new Regulations under section 269 incorporate the
recent interpretation."
Section 269 has been further strengthened by the 1954 addition
of subsection (c). This section generally provides for "prima facie
evidence" of a principal purpose of tax avoidance whenever the
purchase price paid in an acquisition described in subsection (a) is
substantially less than the total of the adjusted basis of the property
acquired—or of the corporation's assets in the case of a stock
purchase—plus the "tax benefits (to the extent not reflected in the
adjusted basis of the property) not available to such person or corpo-
ration otherwise than as a result of such acquisition.' Subsection (c)
thus adds, as one method of determining whether the "principal purpose"
was tax avoidance, a comparison of the price paid with the property
and benefits received. If the discrepancy is not great, then presumably
the tax avoidance purpose did not motivate the purchase; on the
other hand, if the buyer fails to pay "enough" for what he receives,
section 269(c) assumes his primary interest was the carryover rather
than the business. Whatever its merits, the new subsection clearly
makes available to the Commissioner a stronger anti-tax avoidance
section. Finally, the new Regulations, by assuming the prohibited
tax avoidance purpose to be present in certain designated transactions,
will further assist the Commissioner. In particular, Treasury Regu-
lation Section 1.269-3(b)" incorporates into section 269 the Mill Ridge
and Virginia Metal extension of Libson: when a newly bought loss
corporation is injected with a business different in type from its old
activity, tax avoidance will be the presumed primary purpose of the
initial acquisition, even if the loss activity is continued. The combi-
nation of sections 382(a) and 269 should indeed go a long way
towards achieving the Congressional purpose of stopping "trafficking
in corporations with operating loss carryovers.""
88 See, e.g., Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1627 (N.D.
Ala. 1958), rev'd on this point, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959);
T.V.D. Co., 27 T.C. 879 (1957).
89 The first rejection of the Alprosa interpretation occurred in Coastal Oil Storage
Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1957). Following the Coastal Oil view
were the decisions in Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959), reversing on this point, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1627 (ND.
AIa. 1958); and Thomas E. Snyder Sons Co., 34 T.C. No, 39 (Jan. 6, 1960), aff'd 288
F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1961).
90 Treas. Reg. § 1.269(3) (a) (2) (1962).
91 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 269(c) (2).
92 See supra note 83.
03
 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954).
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These provisions of the new Code reflect a Congressional choice
among various policy alternatives that, except in the special re-
organization and "trafficking" situations, carryovers within a single
corporation should be limited only by the application of section 269.
Since section 382(a) was designed to supplement the operation of
section 269 by providing objective criteria. to allow for a conclusive
presumption of tax avoidance in cases felt to involve particular
abuse," it is quite consistent with the underlying rationale that carry-
overs should not be denied after those economic and ownership re-
adjustments which are not motivated primarily by the existence of a
loss carryover.
B. The Policy Alternatives
The alternatives to this choice of policy are many. Indeed, the
original draft of section 382(a) in the House of Representative's
would have eliminated the requirement of continuing the loss oper-
ation and thus would have made carryover availability turn solely on
the fifty per cent shift in ownership.' The American Law Institute
in 1958 also advocated focusing on ownership change alone." Its
report insists that a policy designed to disallow carryovers only in
cases where the desire to evade taxes motivates an acquisition "starts
from too confined a view of the basic issue." 97 In the Institute's view,
the "basic issue" is more properly the question of whether outsiders
in any situation should be able to succeed to carryovers. The con-
clusion it reached was "designed to prevent the unwarranted acqui-
sition of tax benefits by outsiders.' Recognizing that the operation
of a continuity of ownership test operates unfairly to the minority
interests who retain their investment after the purchase of control by
new interests, the report recommended that carryovers be preserved
unless sixty-seven per cent of the stock changes hands within a two-
year period. The ALI's rationale is that, in general, new owners
should not be allowed to benefit from the misfortune of prior owners.
When, however, the old shareholders do retain a substantial interest
in the loss corporation, averaging ought to be allowed in order to
04 See supra note 65. Section 382(a) "in effect, creates an irrebutable presumption
of tax avoidance motivation by eliminating the carryovers where the business is not
continued." Cohen, Phillips, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of
1954: Carryovers and the Accumulated Earnings Tax, 10 Tax L. Rev. 277, 286 (1955).
05
 H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954). An analysis of the merits
of the various policy alternatives is beyond the scope of this article. The textual treat-
ment of several proposals is designed only to illustrate possible alternatives to the
1954 Code approach.
as See American Law Institute, Income Tax Problems of Corporations and Share-
holders, Report of Working Views of a Study by the American Law Institute Staff
and American Bar Association Section of Taxation Liaison Committee (Oct. 31, 1958)
40 [Hereinafter cited as 1958 AUL
07
 Id. at 44.
" Id. at 358.
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enable them to recoup their loss. This approach obviously leaves no
room for section 382 (a)'s test of continuity of loss operation, which
is "inconsistent with a policy based on continuity-of-ownership cri-
teria."" Accordingly, the report recommended the elimination of
section 382(a)(1)(C).
In 1954, the Institute's policy did not reflect this concern over
whether the succession to old carryovers by new owners represented
an unjustified windfall. Its draft of that year showed instead a
concern for disallowing carryovers only when the purpose of the
acquisition was tax avoidance.'" This proposal would have relied on
section 269 alone, but the Congress was unwilling to accept a sugges-
tion that a general anti-tax avoidance section could adequately police
the practice of loss corporation "trafficking."
In 1958, the Advisory Group on Subchapter C reported to the
Ways and Means Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxation a
recommendation which combined certain features of both the con-
tinuity-of-ownership and tax avoidance policy views.101 Under this
proposal carryovers would have been limited following the purchase
of controlling stock in a loss corporation.'" When there was a fifty
per cent ownership change, the available carryover would have been
limited to one-half of the consideration paid. This limitation, oper-
ative only when the minimum shareholder change has occurred, is
related to the net worth of the loss corporation and thus is designed
to prohibit a carryover after a sham transaction or the purchase of a
mere shell.'" Section 269 was to be relied on in all cases not involving
purchase of loss corporation stock and in those stock purchase cases
where the consideration paid was sufficient to preserve the carryover
but the purchase was for the purpose of tax avoidance.
Other suggestions for the appropriate carryover policy to be
applied to the single corporation include the proposal that carryovers
should be allowed irrespective of ownership changes, so long as the
99 Id. at 349-50.
100 Id. at 46-47.
tot Report of Advisory Group on Subchapter C to Ways and Means Subcom-
mittee on Internal Revenue Taxation (Dec. 10, 1958) ; See Hearings Before the House
Ways and Means Committee on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters
C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 473 (1959) [Here-
inafter cited as 1959 Hearings].
102 See 1958 ALI at 343.
191
 Section 269(c) provides for a presumption of tax avoidance when the con-
sideration paid is "substantially disproportionate to" the adjusted basis of the stock
or of the corporation's assets plus the tax benefits not otherwise available. This pro-
vision resembles the proposal of the Advisory Group in that the operative factor in
both cases is the price the purchaser pays; if he pays "enough" in both cases the
carryover is available. If not, § 269(c)'s presumption is operative and if unrebutted
the carryover is lost completely. Under the Advisory Group's proposal, however, the
carryover is merely reduced to one half of the price paid for the stock.
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type of operation generating the losses is continued,'" and that a "free
trade" in carryovers should be permitted with no restrictions what-
soever on their transferability.'
All of these policy approaches were available in 1954 to the
Eighty-Sixth Congress. Its choice was the adoption of sections 381
and 382 and the addition of subsection (c) to 269. This statutory
pattern shows that, absent a section 381 reorganization, the general
policy adopted was one of allowing carryovers except when an ac-
quisition is for the purpose of tax avoidance, as determined ob-
jectively in the "trafficking" case of section 382(a), or subjectively
under section 269. Any extension of the Libson doctrine to deny
carryovers to a single corporation would have to remain consistent
with this choice of policy in order to be consistent with the choice
of the Congress. And yet at least two threatened extensions of the
doctrine—the disallowance of carryovers where only the business
activity or the corporate ownership has changed"—fail to pass this
test of consistency with the underlying policy.
C. The Application of the Doctrine
Libson's "continuity of business enterprise" requirement may
have viability in a number of areas under the new Code. The Revenue
Service has presently deemed it inapplicable only to transactions
covered in section 381(a). 107 But even in section 381 transactions,
Libson's continuity may come into play indirectly since those transac-
tions must first qualify as a section 368 reorganization. Because Re-
venue Ruling 58-603 called attention to the requirements of a section
368 reorganization, it appears that a definition of reorganization
"continuity" framed in Libson terms is being read into section 368.
Further, insolvency reorganizations may have to meet Libson re-
quirements;" the new section 269 Regulations definitely incorporate
the Mill Ridge fact situation as presumptive of tax avoidance;"
and Libson may come to deny succession to tax attributes other than
net operating loss carryovers."°
Perhaps most troublesome is the possible extension of Libson to
deny a carryover (1) when one of the two basic conditions of
section 382(a) has not been violated and where the operation of that
104 See 1959 Hearings at 894, 913 (statement of George Lent); Surrey and War-
ren, supra note 83, at 1604.
105 See Tar!eau, Difficulties Faced by a Taxpayer Trying to Take Tax Advantage
of a Loss Carryover, 4 J. Taxation 91 (1956) ; Cuddihy, 10th Tax Inst., U. of So.
Cal. 303, 306 (1958).
100 See text accompanying notes 112-21 and 136-40 infra.
107 Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 147.
108 A. C. Willingham v. United States, 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1961), makes this
suggestion. See text accompanying note 139 infra.
100 See note 83 supra.
110 Surrey and Warren, supra note 83, at 1589.
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section would therefore not disallow the carryover, and (2) when a
loss corporation in a taxable transaction purchases the assets of a
profitable business and seeks to carry forward its old losses against
the profits from the new business. These two cases pose the questions
of whether a mere change in ownership or in type of business oper-
ation will suffice to allow for an application of Libson. The , remainder
of this article will be devoted to answering these questions.'
Can Libson operate under the new Code to deny a carryover
when the only change occurring within a corporation is a shift in the
type of economic activity it conducts? While the courts have not yet
explicitly agreed with the Commissioner, he has continued to argue
that the answer should be "yes." The Commissioner's present posi-
tion was manifested by his recent removal of acquiescence in the de-
cision of Northway Securities Co. v. Commissioner." 2 The Board of
Tax Appeals in this case rejected the Commissioner's argument that
change of business alone was enough to disallow the carryover. Since
the non-acquiescence is not by its terms restricted to pre-1954 Code
cases, it is highly possible that the Commissioner now considers the
recent Libson extensions 'to justify reassertion of his Northern Se-
curities argument in an appropriate case under the new Code." 3
In Joseph Weidenhoff, Inc.,"' the Commissioner again argued,
as in Northern Securities, that a carryover . should be denied when
the loss is sought as an offset to profits earned in a different type of
business activity. Weidenhoff involved a portion of the consolidated
net operating losses attributable to the Fostoria Screw Co., a member
of an affiliated group, which had sold its assets and discontinued all
operations by the time the group sought to use Fostoria's portion of
the carryover. The Screw company's business activity was not con-
tinued by any other member of the group; thus the losses were sought
as an offset against profits earned later from different activity. The
Government argued that Mill Ridge and Libson "require" disallow-
ance because the profits were earned in years when "the business of
Fostoria was no longer continued by any member of the affiliated
111 When there has been both a change in business and more than a fifty per cent
change in ownership, § 382(a) and the Mill Ridge version of Libson would both op-
erate to deny the carryover. In a 1954 Code case involving this fact situation, the
Tax Court denied the carryover on the basis of § 269 but added that "strong support
for the Commissioner's position on this issue is found in (Mill Ridge, Virginia Metal
and Dudley]." Frank Spignolo Warehouse Co., 37 T.C. No. 1, at 6 (Oct. 6, 1961). While
§ 382(a) would clearly seem to pre-empt the application of Libson when both changes are
present, the result of disallowance of the carryover on the authority of either would accord
with what Congress was seeking to do by enacting § 382(a).
112 23 B.T.A. 532 (1931), acq., X-2 Cum. Bull, 52 (1931), nonacq., 1960-2 Cum.
Bull. 8.
113 See Burnstein, supra note 62, at 1075. The Mill Ridge decision may be viewed
as resting on the business change alone. See supra note 54.
114 32 T.C. 1222 (1959). Weidenhoff was decided under the 1939 Code.
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group."' The Tax Court rejected the argument on the grounds that
the "taxpayer" was the affiliated group rather than Fostoria; even
though the group's composition had changed, its identity as the "tax-
payer" had not.'
At least one case under the 1954 Code has impliedly approved
the Commissioner's position. In Frank Spignolo Warehouse Co.,
Inc.,' although both business and ownership had changed, the Tax
Court interpreted the Libson issue in the following language: "May [a]
single corporation offset losses incurred in one business activity
against profits earned in a different business activity? [The doctrine
of Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler . . . 1" [Emphasis added.] 116 Al-
though deciding the case on tax avoidance grounds, the Court spe-
cifically noted that this interpretation of Libson might well have ap-
plied had tax avoidance not proved dispositive."'
In Kolker Bros., Inc. v. Commissioner,' the taxpayer, incor-
porated to conduct a retail grocery business and generally to deal in
food and beverages, operated an unprofitable retail grocery and
liquor store. It purchased the assets of an insolvent corporation en-
gaged in the .business of selling food to hotels, institutions and res-
taurants. The insolvent activity became profitable and the old busi-
ness was sold. There was no change in the ownership of the taxpayer.
It sought to carry forward the losses from the retail grocery business
to offset the profits obtained from the new business, but the Com-
missioner again argued that Libson and Mill Ridge controlled,
because the income was not produced by "substantially the same busi-
ness" as had incurred the losses. The Tax Court rejected the Gov-
ernment's argument, holding Libson and Mill Ridge distinguishable.
While the opinion is confusing, the court seems to have held that
Libson was not applicable, citing footnote 9, because ". . . there was
here 'a continuity of business enterprise,' with the same taxpayer by
its own operations earning the income and sustaining the losses in-
volved..." 121 Further, the court claimed that even if there were a
requirement that a single corporation offset profits only with losses
from "substantially the same business," this requirement was in fact
met in Kolker due to the "substantial" identity of the retail grocery
and food supply businesses.
In each of the above cases the Commissioner has argued that
losses from one business activity cannot be carried forward to offset
115 Id. at 1237.
110 This conclusion was suggested by the Supreme Court in Libson by its ap-
proval of the result in Koppers. See 353 U.S. at 388 n.7.
117 37 T.C. No. 1 (Oct. 6, 1961).
118 Id. at 4.
115 See supra note 111.
120 35 T.C. 299 (Nov. 21, 1960), CCH 1960 Tax Ct. Reg. Dec. 3257.
121 CCH 1960 Tax Ct. Reg. Dec. at 3261.
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profits earned from another. His argument seems supportable only
by a literal construction of the Supreme Court's language that the
income sought to be offset must be obtained from "substantially the
same business which produced the loss."' This construction is con-
trary to the 1954 statutory scheme which nowhere suggests that the
carryover is lost merely because the business activity has been
changed. While section 382(a) does contain the requirement of con-
tinuity of the loss trade or business, the Regulations show that be-
cause a different type of business may be added and the losses offset
against profits obtained from its operation, the section does not in-
corporate a thesis that carryovers are unavailable merely because of a
change from one type of business to another. 123 Moreover, both the Reg-
ulations and the Senate Committee Report show that the transaction
sought to be outlawed in 'section 382(a) is the stock purchase made
"for the purpose of" using a carryover to offset profits of a business
unrelated to that which caused the losses.' 24 Without the preceding
change of control, any mere change of business activity does not
involve "trafficking" and therefore cannot come within the proscrip-
tion of section 382(a). To say that Libson allows for the super-
imposition of a "type of business" requirement onto section 382(a)
is thus clearly contrary to the statutory pattern.
This inconsistency with the statute is not present in the Kolker-
type case where a loss corporation buys profitable business assets
and seeks a carryforward against the profits from the new enterprise.
This fact situation is not covered specifically in the 1954 Code, 125
but it is submitted that to invoke Libson in this case is equally un-
warranted as a matter of desirable carryover policy.
The law presently provides that a corporation conducting busi-
nesses A and B may in one year offset losses from A against profits
from B, and in the following year, a net loss can be carried over to
offset that year's profits obtained from the conduct of B. Further-
more, if A is sold at a loss, this loss may be carried over against later
profits from B.120
 These results reflect a policy (a) not to attach a
carryover to a particular line of endeavor, and (b) not to require
that the loss business remain in operation in order for the offset to
be allowed. It would appear to follow that the corporation could use
some of the profits from B to buy the assets of business C and later
offset C's profits with losses unexpectedly incurred in the conduct
of B. But a broad reading of Mill Ridge and Virginia Metal plus the
1=2 353 U.S. at 386.
123 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1-382(2)-1(h)(8), 25 Fed. Reg. 13779 (1960).
124 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1954) ; Proposed Treas. Reg. §1-382
(2)-1(h)(5), 25 Fed. Reg. 13778 (1960).
125
 Surrey and Warren, supra note 83, at 1600-01,
126 See Burnstein, supra note 62, at 1076.
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Commissioner's argument in Kolker claim that this cannot be done;
the purchase of C has destroyed the needed "continuity of business
enterprise." In view of what may be done short of the purchase and
the policy of allowing intra-corporate economic flexibility which un-
derlies this permissible latitude, it is difficult to see why a line should
be drawn at the point of the purchase of assets. If the purchase of a
new business suggested tax avoidance, then clearly the drawing of
the line might be justified.' But when a loss corporation merely
seeks to regain its economic health in a new line of business, its choice
is not the evasion of tax but rather the evasion of economic death.
A loss corporation's desire to try a new line of business activity,
while it may have tax benefits, has not traditionally been considered
a tax avoidance measure since legitimate business reasons would very
often dictate the abandonment of a losing venture and a new start
in more promising activity.' But if the new business cannot utilize
an old carryover, the law is in effect taxing "on a business-by-busi-
ness basis rather than on the taxpayer as a whole." 12° Furthermore,
the result is to grant carryovers only to those who correctly anticipate
a profitable future for a certain business, a seemingly unjustified
basis upon which to rest the equitable privilege of averaging.' 30
Moreover, Revenue Ruling 58-603 provides that Libson is not
applicable to a section 368(a) (1)(C) reorganization where a loss
corporation purchases assets in exchange for its stock; only section
382(b) is brought into play to ensure a required minimum con-
tinuity of ownership. Despite the solicitude revealed by the Congress
in section 381 and the Treasury Department in its Revenue Ruling,
it is hard to justify the discrimination inherent in the result urged
by the Commissioner that a taxable purchase of those assets will
operate to disallow any subsequent carryover. This result seems par-
ticularly unjustified in view of the fact that the purchaser for cash
has already paid the price of a tax on the gain; the purchaser for
127 Two cases support the proposition that the purchase of "profitable assets" by
a loss corporation does not necessarily indicate tax avoidance but rather is in pursuit
of a legitimate business purpose. In Kolker Bros., supra note 120,_ the court held
that an asset purchase has a "bona fide business purpose" with no aim of accom-
plishing indirectly what is forbidden by § 269. Cell 1960 Tax Ct. Reg. Dec. at 3261.
In T.V.D. Co., 27 T.C. 879 (1957), the court also foUnd an asset purchase undertaken
for the legitimate purpose of enabling a corporation to "remedy [a] deficiency and to
place Ethe taxpayer] in position to realize future earnings." Id. at 885.
128 Comment, 69 Yale L.J. 1201, '1258 (1960) notes that "Individuals and Single
corporations have long been able to retain their carryovers despite conversion from
one line of endeavor to another." Despite this, the authors recognize that Libson could
presage an extension to the case of a loss corporation purchasing "profitable assets."
Id. at 1269. For examples of many suggestions that such an ,extension would be un-
sound, see Krantz, Loss Carryovers in Chapter X Reorganizations, 16 Tax. L. Rev.
359, 400 (1960) and Winton, supra note 16, at 77.
129 Arent, supra note 62, at 963.
13°
	 Levine and Petta, supra note 31, at 453.
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stock gets the benefit both of non-recognition of gain and of an avail-
able carryover.
Since the purchased assets must be of a business qualitatively
distinct from the loss activity in order for the carryover to be denied
under the Commissioner's view, there exist serious definitional prob-
lems which must be resolved in order to determine whether or not
the loss and profit activities are "substantially the same!' The Kolker
decision illustrates a court struggling without any guiding criteria
to an arbitrary determination that the business of retail grocery sell-
ing was "substantially the same" as the subsequent business of sup-
plying meat to institutional buyers!" These problems are much the
same as those encountered under the section 382 (a) (1) (C) require-
ment of continuity of the loss operation. The Regulations have de-
lineated a number of criteria as bearing on the question of when a
given activity is qualitatively not the "same" as a predecessor activ-
ity, but the close questions are left unresolved."' These definitional
difficulties, together with the economically undesirable results en-
gendered when a corporation, for fear of losing its carryover, fails to
institute changes otherwise demanded by the business situation, are
avoided when total carryover flexibility among types of endeavor
within a single corporation is allowed.
Still further, can an approach which allows carryovers only
among businesses "substantially the same" be reconciled with pro-
visions allowing a consolidated group to carry forward the loss suf-
fered in the operation of the discontinued business of one of the
members of the group?"' Why should a single corporation with only
one line of business activity not enjoy this particular privilege given
to taxpayers filing a single consolidated return?
Finally, the commentators agree that an extension of Libson to
deny a carryover only because it is sought as an offset to a different
type of activity conducted by the same corporation produces an un-
desirable result. 134
 Their concern seems to be that, whereas the Libson
doctrine as extended in Mill Ridge (where both business and owner-
ship changed) may have been necessary to prevent carryovers in tax
avoidance-inspired "trafficking" cases, the doctrine may come to
envelope traditionally legitimate economic adjustments from one
form of activity to another.
The final question remaining for discussion is whether a Libson
test framed in terms of continuity of ownership alone can be applied
131
 See text following note 121 supra.
132
 See text accompanying note 81 supra.
133
 This carryover flexibility is clearly available to consolidated return taxpayers.
Joseph Weidenhoff, Inc., supra note 68.
131
 See, in addition to authorities cited at notes 126-30 supra, Sinrich, supra note
44, at 178.
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under the 1954 Code. The suggestion that it might was originally
made in the Mill Ridge case, where although both the type of busi-
ness and the ownership had changed, the court's language of "wind-
fall" and "trading" in loss carryovers implied that the ownership
change may itself have destroyed the required continuity.'' The
recent decision of A. C. Willingham v. United States,'" like Mill
Ridge a 1939 Code case, has materially strengthened the suggestion
because it involved no change of business operation. The case con-
cerned the availability of a carryover after a Chapter X bankruptcy
reorganization of a corporation engaged in the trucking business. As
part of the reorganization plan, all of the corporate stock was pur-
chased by a new owner who pledged five per cent of the gross receipts
to his vendor; most of the debts were wiped out, but the trucking
business and the entity continued without change. The corporation
sought to carry forward a pre-reorganization loss against subsequent
profits but the Fifth Circuit held that the carryover was unavailable.
The court cited both Libson and Mill Ridge, holding that the post-
reorganization corporation was a "new business enterprise"; the
"complete identification" of the sole shareholder with the "new"
corporation made it a "completely, different corporate person" from
the pre-reorganization company.'" Though the same business activity
was continued it was "by a corporation having entirely new stock
ownership and with an entirely new corporate structure."'" While
the bankruptcy reorganization may have itself destroyed the needed
continuity, one commentator has suggested it was more likely "that
the decisive fact in the Willingham case was that an outsider who
had no previous connection with the loss corporation was the sole
individual who would benefit from allowance of the loss carryover." 139
This conclusion is supported by the Government's own version of
continuity as having been destroyed only by the ownership change.
It argued that the new owner ". . . has so identified himself with the
corporate taxpayer . . . and because of his complete domination and
management, as to make it in substance, though not in form, a sep-
arate taxpayer."'"
The Willingham concept of continuity is clearly at odds with
the 1954 Code provisions. Under section 382 (a), when a corporation
undergoes no change in business, a change in ownership alone will
not result in the disallowance of a carryover absent the application
of section 269. This is because "There is obviously no trafficking in
138 See supra note 54.
138 289 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1961).
137 Id. at 287.
138 Id. at 286.
139
 Krantz, supra note 128, at 414.
140 289 F.2d at 286.
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loss corporations where the same business continued."'" The stock
purchase is not undertaken "for the purpose of" using a carryover
against a business unrelated to the loss activity if the loss activity
never changes. While the Congress had available the choice of dis-
allowing carryovers simply on the basis of a significant shift in owner-
ship, instead its choice was that a "Change in stock ownership alone
should not affect the corporation's tax attributes, except in cases of
abuse," as would be indicated by a subsequent change of business
activity. 142 "For this reason it is unlikely that the strict holding of
the Willingham case will be regarded as controlling in cases arising
under the 1954 Code." 143
In short, the only abuse outside the tax-free reorganization area
which Congress felt to warrant more than the general sanction pro-
vided by section 269 was the special section 382(a) case involving
both an ownership and a business change. The extension of Libson
to require disallowance of a carryover when only one of these changes
is present is therefore inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The
Code contains no substantive determination that ownership or busi-
ness change should disallow a carryover except as the two are used
together in a situation predominantly without any purpose other than
to obtain the use of an existing loss carryover.
CONCLUSION
The Libson doctrine of "continuity of business enterprise"
should die a quiet death. The reluctance exhibited by the courts to
apply Libson to 1954 Code cases is understandable in view of the
marked difference between the comprehensive new statutory treat-
ment of loss carryovers and the 1939 Code's sole provision capable
of preventing abuse of the carryover privilege—a largely inoperative
section 129. It was inevitable in the context of the old Code that a
doctrine would be developed to supplement section 129. In the merger
case, the answer came in Libson Shops, where the Court interpreted
the carryover provisions "to prevent their use to obtain tax deduc-
tions not otherwise available."'" Despite the difficulties of extending
a doctrine which appeared to be applicable only to the merger case,
the courts in several cases under the 1939 Code have applied Libson
to the single corporation on the theory that a similar supplement to
section 129 was needed in this area as well. Mill Ridge and Virginia
Metal decided that Libson easily encompassed the case where changes
in both business activity and ownership revealed "trafficking" in a
141 1959 Hearings at 774 (Statement of Mr. Hauser).
142 Cohen, Phillips, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, supra note 94, at 286; see 7
Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation 151 (1956 ed.).
142 Krantz, supra note 128, at 412.
144 Reese, supra note 79, at 220.
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loss corporation. The extension of "continuity of business enterprise"
to cover this case, while arguably not justified as a matter of strict
interpretation of Libson, did produce a result consistent with the
choice of policy revealed in section 382(a).
But unlike the 1939 Code, section 382(a), a materially-strength-
ened section 269 and the Regulations under both reflect a carefully
considered Congressional determination of what readjustments within
the single corporation warrant disallowance of a carryover. The super-
imposition of a Libson test would clearly upset this determination.
When both business and ownership have changed, section 382(a)
and not Libson should govern the availability of a carryover. When
only one change is present, denial of a carryover in the name of
Libson invokes a policy which the Congress might have adopted in
1954 but did not.
In sum, just as the application of Libson to tax-free reorganiza-
tions has been precluded so as not to frustrate Congressional solici-
tude for the effectuation of such reorganizations, its application to
the single corporation should be prevented in order not to interfere
with the decision that only certain specified readjustments should
cause disallowance of a carryover.
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